We study the role of social identity in determining the impact of social fragmentation on public good provision using laboratory experiments. We find that as long as there is some degree of social fragmentation, increasing it leads to lower public good provision. This is mainly because the share of those who contribute fully to the public good diminishes with social fragmentation, while the share of free-riders is unchanged, which suggests social identity preferences drive our result, as opposed to self-interest. Importantly, socially homogeneous groups do not generate the highest contributions: some social diversity is actually welfareimproving. Finally, social fragmentation is felt differently for visible minorities, whose contributions are higher than minority groups whose actions are not identifiable.
Introduction
"In the presence of diversity, we hunker down. We act like turtles. The effect of diversity is worse than had been imagined. And it's not just that we don't trust people who are not like us. In diverse communities, we don't trust people who do look like us." Robert D. Putnam (2007) We live in an ever increasingly diverse world, whether measured in terms of ethnicity, religion or language. For instance, in the US there has been an increase in the proportion of ethnic minorities. While currently accounting for roughly one third of the population, they are expected to become the majority in 2042 (US Census, 2009).
Increasing social and ethnic diversity in societies may have important economic consequences, namely on public good provision. Ethnic or social fragmentation has emerged as a potential explanation for low public good provision in settings as diverse as African countries (Easterly and Levine, 1997) and US cities (Alesina et al., 1999) . A fundamental question is why this is the case.
The literature on the effect of social fragmentation on economic performance has identified two main causes for the negative relationship between higher fragmentation and public good provision. On one hand, different social or ethnic groups may prefer different public goods (Poterba, 1998) . On the other hand, different social groups may dislike sharing a public good with one another (Luttmer, 2001 ).
Distinguishing between these two causes is very difficult. To see why, consider a hypothetical outdoors space between two neighbourhoods, each of whom is dominated by one of two distinct social groups, say Indians and Portuguese. This space is potentially suitable as a sports park, conditional on there being sufficient private investment by community members. Private provision of sports facilities may be insufficient because Indians prefer to play cricket, while the Portuguese may prefer soccer. Alternatively, it could be that the Indian and Portuguese communities do not want to share the space with each other due to discriminatory preferences. However, from the point of view of an outsider, it is impossible to ascertain why public good provision is low.
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Theories of inter-group relations in social sciences have argued that discriminatory behaviour across ethnic or religious lines stem from competition for resources (Allport, 1954; Sherif et al., 1988) . Economists have broadly taken two approaches to model the role of social affiliation. The first approach emphasises that group affiliation is an important tool to overcome market imperfections by promoting trust among members of a given social group and therefore be able to overcome moral hazard problems (La Ferrara, 2003; Bowles and Gintis, 2004) . At the core of this approach is a game-theoretic argument based on repeated interaction, in that more identical groups should be able to achieve and sustain cooperative outcomes as equilibria via internal mechanisms of monitoring and social norm enforcement.
The second is to assume that a sense of group identity enters individual preferences.
In this sense, individuals define themselves as a function of the group(s) to which they belong. 1 As such, an individual may shape his behaviour as a function of group norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000); or care not only about his well-being, but also about the well-being of his fellow group members (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Shayo, 2009; Fehr and Hoff, 2011 ). This approach is in the spirit of social identity theory, which explains the basis for discriminatory behaviour across groups (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1979 ).
Our paper investigates, using laboratory experiments, whether higher social fragmentation leads to lower public good provision and to what extent identity-based discrimination can explain such behaviour. We eliminate the possibility that different groups may prefer alternative public goods by allowing for only one public good to which members of both groups may contribute. We generate two artificial groups in the lab, and we exogenously change the degree of fragmentation by varying the relative size of each group in the population playing the public good game. This allows us to measure the interaction between social identity and fragmentation on public good provision cleanly.
We considered two information conditions in the main treatment: in one, subjects could observe the contributions of each individual as well as his social group membership (though never his actual identity). In the other condition, subjects could only see the total contribution made by the other five subjects.
We find that a higher degree of social fragmentation leads to significantly lower contribution levels and the highest contribution levels are observed with the lowest level of fragmentation. Interestingly, this result comes from a drop in the share of players who contribute maximally, rather than an increase in the fraction of free-riders, which remains roughly constant across treatments.
However, fully homogenous populations do not contribute more than highly fragmented ones and contribute less than minimally fragmented populations. This implies that an in-group affiliation is a powerful driver for cooperation, such that some diversity may be beneficial; however, such an affiliation only works in the presence of an out-group.
The impact of information on contributions is two-fold. On one hand, contributions are on average higher when individual contributions are identifiable than when information on aggregate contributions is available, irrespective of fragmentation levels. On the other hand, the comparative static effects of social fragmentation are more salient in the condition where only aggregate information is available. Furthermore, when individual contribution levels are available, we do not observe any differences between majorities and minorities; however, minorities contribute significantly less to the public good when only aggregate information is available.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section briefly reviews the empirical literature on fragmentation, as well as the experimental literature on social identity. Section ?? outlines a simple model of social identity preferences which we use to set up the hypotheses underpinning the experiments. Section ?? outlines the experimental design and procedures and section ?? presents the results. Section ??
concludes the paper with a discussion of the results. Tajfel and Turner (1979) first demonstrated the effect of group affiliation on behaviour using experimental data. They showed that subjects playing simple distribution games as a dictator would discriminate in favour of in-group members (and thus violating basic norms of equality), even when the basis for the existence of the group was quite minimal -in this case, it was based on subjects' preferences over paintings from two artists. This finding has since been replicated in a number of experimental studies (Haslam, 2004) .
Most economics experiments focusing on the impact of group identity on cooperation have looked at pure in-group/out-group differences in two-player cooperation games, where a subject either plays against an in-group member or an out-group member.
Notable exceptions are Eckel and Grossman (2005) , who looked at a team production 2 Other papers analysing social fragmentation and economic outcomes include La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) Regarding the effect of ethnic diversity, Espinosa and Garza (1985) and Cox et al. (1991) found that individuals from minority cooperated more with fellow minority participants than with majority subjects. Habyarimana et al. (2007) combined experimental methods with survey data and found public good provision was highest in areas when group composition was homogenous along ethnic lines.
The Model
In this section we will first propose a model of how individuals incorporate group identity into their preferences. We then apply this model to a linear public good provision game.
We propose hypotheses to test the effect of group identity on public good provision when there are two distinct social groups, as well as the effect on contributions of varying the relative size of each group.
Social Identity Preferences
We analyse the impact of social identity by making social preferences contingent on group membership. We adapt the functional form proposed by McLeish and Oxoby (2007) , where an individual maximises a combination of his payoffs and others payoffs, whose weights are a function of group membership:
, where g ∈ {I, O} indicates whether the other player is an in-group (I), or an out-group member(O). π −i is the average payoff of a member of group g, which we can interpret 6 as the 'prototypical' member of group g.
Chen and Li (2009) estimate parameter values for α g i,t in a number of two-player games and find that α
. In other words, individuals express higher concern for welfare of fellow in-group members than for out-group members. We extend this model by allowing for the relative size of the in-group and out-group with which an individual plays to vary. 3 We allow α g i to change as a function of the relative size of each group. In particular we postulate that α g i is a function of S, where S ≡
#I #I+#O
. A large literature in psychology and sociology starting from Allport (1954) has looked at how inter-group discrimination varies as a function of the relative sizes of two groups and this literature forms the basis of our assumptions regarding the functional form of α First, Brewer (1991) postulates that in-group identification is the product of two opposing needs. On one hand, individuals have a distinct need for inclusion. As such, they feel the need to identify herself with a collective unit. On the other hand, people 3 While the empirical literature on fragmentation has considered cases where there are multiple social groups, we feel that restricting our attention to the two-group case is justified on two grounds. The use of two groups allows us to adequately capture the notion of fragmentation for purposes of analysis.
Also, this paper is a first step in analysing the effect of fragmentation, and therefore, a two-group setup is a reasonable starting point. 4 Allport (1954) first recognised that attachment towards one's in-groups should be seen separately from potential hostility towards out-groups.
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also have a need for distinctiveness: if a person is a member of an excessively large group, she feels the need to search for differentiation. Interpreting this in light of our model, this implies an inverted-U relationship between α I i (S) and S. Subjects will feel a strong in-group bias when they are in medium-sized groups, rather than in extremely large or small groups.
The second bias captured by α O i (S) is the threat that out-group members pose when groups are competing over physical resources (Levine and Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1953.) So as hostility against out-group members increases as biases for in-group members increase. The implication is that α O i (S) will be U-shaped, where it is lowest (possibly negative) when the relative size of the in-group is intermediate, and highest when S is either close to zero or close to one. 
Public Good
There are n players, who participate in a VCM game. Players contribute c i towards a public good and receive a monetary payoff π i such that
where y is the initial endowment and a is a parameter, 0 < a < 1 < na. There are two distinct sub-groups in the n player group. By belonging to one of the two sub-groups, player i will have in-group members and out-group members. The number of out-group members are #O and the number of in-group members are #I = n − 1 − #O.
Let player i's preferences be described by the following Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
where α Combining equations ?? and ??, we obtain a utility function for player i that is a function of own contribution (c i ), average in-group contributions other than player i
Experimental design and procedures
We begin the section by outlining the experimental design which is the basis for our hypotheses. We then report the procedures used to collect the data.
Experimental Design
As stated earlier, we wish to test the impact on public good contribution of changes in the relative size of the in-group. We now construct the hypotheses for our experiment.
Our experimental design, described in detail below, consists of a six-player linear public good game, with players belonging to one of two groups. We vary the relative size of the groups, from one extreme where all players belong to same group, to the case when there half of the players belong to one group and the other half belong to the other group. This allows us to vary the level of fragmentation in a population and measure the levels of contribution to the public good as a function of fragmentation.
7 Table ? ? describes the experimental design. The two rows relate to two information treatments, Public and Restrict, on which we elaborate below. The columns describe the degree of fragmentation; the entries within the table indicate the number of independent groups we collected for that condition. The control treatment is when agents played the public good game without inducing group identity.
Our first hypothesis concerns the relevance of identity-driven preferences. As noted in the discussion of identity preferences, it is only in the presence of an out-group that both the favourable in-group and the adverse out-group biases are salient. Recall that for player i, α I i (S) and α O i (S) capture his in-group and out-group biases as a function of the relative social fragmentation S. As S changes, so does the intensity of these biases. If the population consists of all players belonging to the same identity, then neither negative out-group biases nor positive in-group biases will exist. As such, contributions from players in populations where all players belong to the same group should be no different from contributions in populations where group identity is absent (α
Therefore, average contributions in 6-0 should be the same as average contributions in
Control.
Hypothesis 1: Contributions to the public good by homogenous groups (6-0 ) are no different than contributions by anonymous groups (Control ). 7 While the word population is used in a very different context in game theory, we use it here to describe the set of six players playing the public goods game. This avoids using terms like sub-group to refer to each of the two social groups in the six-player game.
Next, we set up the two main hypotheses of the paper. They address the relationship between social fragmentation (as measured by the relative proportion of each group in the population) and contributions to the public good. We are interested in the effect of fragmentation per se, as well as the comparative static effect of increasing the level of fragmentation on behaviour.
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When we replace a player in a homogeneous population 6-0 with an out-group member to construct a 5-1 group, we expect that identity-based biases will become salient.
The presence of one outsider will introduce the positive in-group bias α I i (S) and the negative out-group bias α I i (S). Since there is just one out-group member the negative bias though present will be weak. Hence, we expect that there will be an increase in average contributions. As a result we get our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2:
Increasing the number of out-group members from zero to one will lead to an increase in contributions to the public good.
According to the preferences and utility function described above, we hypothesise there will be a level of social fragmentation S for which positive in-group and negative out-group biases will be largest. Taking the 5-1 condition as a starting point, as we increase the relative size of the minority, not only the minority group becomes more salient, but the majority group becomes less dominant. As such, the players' in-group biases should increase -majority members become less common, while minority members become part of a more meaningful group. Likewise, the negative out-group biases should also become more salient as the concern for one's group increases.
The effect of social fragmentation on contributions will depend on whether or not the favourable in-group bias will dominate the negative out-group bias. If, as the proportion of in-group (S) falls, the favourable in-group bias, α I i (S), increases at a faster rate than the negative bias against the out-group members, α O i (S), then we should expect to see an increase in aggregate public good contribution as fragmentation increases. If instead, the negative out-group bias grows faster than the positive in-group bias then we will see a drop in public good contributions as fragmentation increases. Since we have neither a theoretical basis nor prior empirical results to determine which effect will dominate, we state our next hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 3a: Contributions to the public good game will be unaffected by social fragmentation.
If we reject Hypothesis 3a, we must specify the direction of the change in contributions due to changes in social fragmentation. This is formalised as follows:
Contributions to the public good game will decline as social fragmentation increases.
We now turn to the issue of how minorities will differ from majorities in terms of their contributions to the public good. As explained above, as the size of the minority increases, the positive in-group biases and negative out-group biases will become more salient.
Whether or not the majority players will contribute on average more than the minority players will depend on whether the negative biases towards out-group will dominate the positive in-group biases (which determine whether contributions go up or down as fragmentation increases), but also whether such changes are more pronounced for one group than for the other. If, for instance, the positive in-group biases dominate negative out-group biases, and that effect is more pronounced for minority players, then the minority players will on average contribute more than majority players. We state our hypothesis as:
There will be no difference in contributions to the public good between majority and minority players.
We conclude this section by formalising the hypotheses regarding the two information conditions. The concept of social fragmentation in general, and the roles of majorities and minorities in particular, are applied typically to large populations and large groups.
In that sense, there is a disconnect between what we can implement in the lab and what we observe in reality. To mitigate that discrepancy, we created two information conditions that capture the extent to which an individual's actions are more or less visible to the remainder of the population. In Public, it is possible to identify individuals' actions, although we do not allow reputation formation to occur (see the following section for details.) On one hand, individual visibility could arguably lead to higher contributions (Dana et al., 2011) . On the other hand, this could cloud the effect of social fragmentation by emphasising individual-level contributions as opposed to group outcomes. To test for this effect, we implemented a second information condition, Restrict, where subjects were only given information about total contributions by the other five players in their population. We hypothesise that the comparative static effect of social fragmentation should be more salient in the condition where subjects only receive feedback about total contributions by the other five players.
Hypothesis 5:
The effect of social fragmentation on contribution levels should be more salient in the Restrict condition than in the Public condition.
An interesting consequence of providing feedback on individual contributions is that in the 5-1 condition, members of the majority sub-group can identify the contribution of the minority individual (without compromising his anonymity). Recent evidence from trust games suggests that singling out an individual leads to significant changes in behaviour (Galeotti and Zizzo, 2012 ). In our setting, being able to identify the contributions of the minority player in the 5-1 condition could lead that individual to match the contribution of the majority and therefore contribute more than if his individual contribution was not possible to identify. This is our last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6:
Contributions by the minority element in the 5-1 condition will be higher in Public than in Restrict. 
Experimental Procedures
Before proceeding, a methodological note is warranted. To tackle our research question, unlike field studies which draw on real forms of identity such as language (Easterly (1971). We induce identity via participants' choices of paintings -an arbitrary task which is completely unrelated to the main focus of the experiment.
While an arbitrary identity has the drawback of artificiality, it also allows the experimenter to study the relevance of social identity on behaviour, while isolating the effect of individual preferences from the effect of a previous history of interaction. This By combining an artificial identity with strict anonymity in choices, the experimenter can ensure that this is the only salient factor which influences choices. We can then study the effect of identity while teasing out repeated interaction effects. While studying the effect of particular types of identity such as gender or race is very important, we feel that working with a generic identity fits the purpose of this study best.
Our experimental procedure encompasses three stages. 9 The choice of paintings were chosen to be as similar as possible.
14 were assigned to the Klee group. Otherwise they would be assigned to the Kandinsky group. This meant that we could not guarantee that exactly half the participants in a given session would go to one of the groups. However, the variation in group size across sessions was small.
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Stage 2: Identity Reinforcement. Once the Klee and Kandinsky groups were established, to reinforce their sense of identity, subjects were given a team-building exercise.
This exercise consisted of identifying the authorship of two further paintings, one of which was painted by Klee and the other by Kandinsky. Participants were allowed to confer with fellow group members through a chat box for ten minutes. Communication was almost unrestricted; participants were not allowed to use abusive language and they
were not allowed to identify themselves. Members of the Klee group could only see their own fellow group members comments and vice-versa. Participants received an individual payment for each painting they correctly identified. A copy of the instruction set is in the Appendix.
Results
We begin by looking at aggregate level treatment effects which establish our main result.
We then proceed by investigating the effect fragmentation has on the distribution of contributions. We finalise the section by looking at individual level effects -in particular we measure how strength of group affiliation affects contributions. Finally, we also find no statistical difference between the average contribution of the homogenous group, 6-0, and the fully fragmented group, 3-3, both in Restricted and
Aggregate Effects of Fragmentation

Public.
11 This suggests that fully homogeneous groups perform no better than fully fragmented ones.
Regression (2) factors in the fact that there are minority and majority groups in two of the fragmentation conditions (5-1 and 4-2), and therefore allows for the possibility that minority and majority sub-groups in a given treatment may on average contribute different amounts. We find that there is a slight difference between majority and minority sub-groups in the Restricted condition, but that difference is not significant. What is interesting is that the difference in coefficients between 6-0 and 5-1 ×Restricted is significant (F (1, 59) = 4.55, p = 0.04.) Furthermore, the difference in average contributions between 5-strong majority and 4-strong majority is also significant (5-1 ×Restricted = 4-2 ×Restricted : F (1, 59) = 5.79, p = 0.02.) However, we do not find significant differences when we make the same comparisons in the Public condition.
These results hint at the possibility that the minority members in the 5-1 may be behaving differently in the Restricted and Public conditions, due to the fact that they are "quasi-identifiable". However, we find no significant difference between the average 
Modelling the Contribution Decision
Focusing the analysis on average effects neglects the possibility that social fragmentation may affect the distribution of contributions significantly while having a small impact on the average. We start by looking at the distributions of contribution levels for each of the fragmentation conditions in both information conditions.
Inspection of Figure ? ? shows that the extent to which subjects free-ride on the public good (i.e. zero contributions) is higher in Restrict than in Public for all fragmentation levels. Furthermore, we see there is a jump in full contributions, when we go from a fully homogeneous group to the 5-1 case. Finally, we can observe a decline in full contributions as we increase the level of fragmentation in both Public and Restrict.
In order to econometrically model the contribution decision by subjects, we first note that subjects had to pick a contribution level between 0 and 20. In other words, the set of strategies was bounded above and below. Furthermore, Figure ? ? shows there is a non-trivial amount of observations at both boundary points. As such, estimating the conditional mean of such a distribution through ordinary least squares will not only ignore important features of the distribution, it will not guarantee that predicted values are within the support of the strategy space.
We proceed by estimating a two-part model. First we normalise the data by dividing individual contributions by 20, such that the support of the distribution of contributions is the unit interval. We model observations at the boundaries of the support of the 
13
Our econometric modelling strategy explicitly distinguishes three types of decisions.
The first is whether or not to free-ride and contribute nothing to the public good. The second is whether to contribute the whole endowment to the public good. This type of behaviour can be consistent with altruistic preferences, or by our model of social preferences and identity. These two decisions are modelled using a discrete choice model in the first part of our two-part model. Finally, the third alternative is how much to contribute to the public good, given that a subject neither wants to free-ride, nor to fully contribute his endowment. This is estimated using the second part of our econometric where β 1 is a vector of variable coefficients and F (.) is a distribution function to be chosen by the econometrician. In our case, we will estimate this model using the ordered probit model.
The second part of our model deals with instances where the participant chooses a positive contribution level which is less than his full endowment for that period:
13 We nevertheless conducted random effects Tobit estimations as robustness checks, which we report in the Appendix to this paper. With the exception of the results from regression (2), the results of the Tobit estimates are consistent with the analysis of the two-part model, although naturally the interpretation of the results is slightly different.
where M (.) is a distribution function. As such, the two part-model can be described as follows:
To contribute maximally, or not at all?
We begin by reporting the data on the estimation of the decision whether to free-ride, or to contribute the maximum amount, which we execute through a random effects ordered probit model.
Regression (3) models the probability of contributing zero or one hundred percent of one's endowment as a function of treatment dummies plus a period variable to account for learning during the session. The omitted category is the Control treatment without identity. A positive (negative) coefficient means that an increase in the value of the regression leads to an increase (decrease) in the predicted probability of moving from the lower threshold, zero contributions, to the higher threshold of full contribution.
We see that with the exception of 5-1 × Restrict, all treatment dummy coefficients are negative and highly significant, which implies we are more likely to observe full contributions in the Control treatment than in either Public or Restrict treatments.
Focusing on the effect of fragmentation, we see that the coefficients on 5-1 in both information conditions are significantly larger than those for 6-0 and 4-2. That is, subjects in the 5-1 condition are more likely to fully contribute to the public good than players in either 6-0 and 4-2. Furthermore, the coefficients on the 6-0 and 3-3 are not statistically different in either Public or Restrict. . We find that in all treatments, the higher the average contributions by other subjects in the previous period, the more likely it is that a subject in this period will make the maximum contribution. This effect is strongest for the Restricted condition. In the Public condition, we can distinguish between the average contributions of in-group and out-group subjects, but we find no difference in the coefficients. 
Restrict
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We are also interested in how the strength of affiliation may accentuate the effect of group fragmentation. To test for this, we resort to a number of different variables, based on the transcripts from the chat stage in the first stage of the experiment. We employed two independent reviewers who coded the group conversations according to the following key concepts: generic statements, expressions of agreement, which indicate strong team building; expressions of disagreement, which indicate weak team dynamics; the reviewers counted the number of times a subject asked a question during the chat stage and the number of times he obtained an answer, which may be proxies for reciprocity (Chen and Chen, 2011) . 16 Finally, we also included the number of lines recorded for each group, which measure the degree of involvement in the task. We aggregated those measures at the group level. Regression (6) completes the analysis by looking at strength of identity.
We find the number of lines has no effect on behaviour. The coefficient on Statement is positive and significant but, surprisingly, the coefficient on Agreement is negative and significant. As such, we are unable to draw any conclusive answers from strength of identity.
How much to contribute if not everything?
We now turn to the fractional regression component of the analysis. In other words, we now focus on subjects' decision of how much to contribute, given that they did not want to neither fully-free ride nor fully contribute. Table ? ? reports the output of the random effects probit estimations.
Regression (7) focuses on treatment effects using dummy variables, where Control is the omitted variable. Focusing on treatment conditions, we see a significant difference between the 5-1 × Restricted condition and both 6-0 × Restricted and 4-2 ×
Restricted, in that we are more likely to observe higher contributions in the former, 16 We compared the two reviewers' coding using a measure of consistency (Cronbach's alpha) and we only incorporated variables in which the coefficient was above 0.8. This was the case for generic statements, expressions of agreement and questions. However, the measure of consistency between coders was poor for the answer variable. As such, we decided to exclude both question and answer variables. than in either of the latter two. On the other hand, the same comparisons in the Public condition only yield significant differences when comparing 6-0 to 5-1. We find no significant differences between the 6-0 and 3-3 conditions in Restricted, but a significant difference in Public.
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Regression (8) augments (7) by accounting for minorities in the 4-2 and 5-1 conditions. Contrary to the analysis of full/no-contributions, We find non-significant coefficients on 5-1 × Restricted × Min and 4-2 × Public × Min. In other words, conditional on contributing a positive amount, 2-strong minorities will contribute more on average than their majority counterparts when feedback about contributions is restricted to the aggregate, but not when individual-level contributions are known. In the 5-1 case, the role of information is reversed: there are no differences in average contributions between minority and majority in Restricted, while in Public the minority players contribute on average less than the majority.
Regression (9) considers the effect of past average contribution levels on current contributions. Higher past average contributions by the other subjects imply a higher average contribution today. In the case of Public, the effect is larger for in-group members than for out-group members (Public × c the likelihood of fully contributing to the public good, while having the opposite effect on subjects who only contribute a fraction of their endowment.
Discussion
Social fragmentation, along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines has been identified as the cause for low public good provision in settings as diverse as U.S cities and rural Pakistan. However, the existing research on social fragmentation has been unable to identify the underlying mechanism which causes societies with higher levels of fragmentation to under-perform. Is this caused by discriminatory preferences based on a sense of affiliation towards a social group, or is it instead caused by the fact that different social groups may prefer different types of public goods?
The present paper seeks to understand the extent to which the former explanation is at the heart of this problem. We conducted an experiment where two artificial social groups could contribute to a single public good. Keeping the total number of players constant, we systematically varied the relative size of the two groups as a proxy of social fragmentation. In one extreme, we minimised fragmentation by having all players belong to the same group. In the other extreme, we maximised fragmentation by having half of players belonged to one group, while the other half belonged to the other group.
The evidence we report to some extent qualifies the results from the existing literature. In the context of our experiment, in the absence of outsiders a sense of identity is irrelevant with respect to the contributions to the public good. Indeed, our data found that the average contribution by subjects in games where everyone was from the same group were no different from those subjects who played the same game in an identityfree condition. This suggests that one's sense of belonging to a particular group is a function of how salient that group is. Once everyone is a member of the same group, membership of that group ceases to have meaning, and this is reflected in the behaviour in the experiment.
However, our data partially replicates the pattern shown by the empirical literature:
so long as there is some degree of social fragmentation, then increasing social fragmentation decreases public good provision. However, socially homogeneous populations do not exhibit higher contributions than maximally fragmented populations. This suggests that there is an optimal level of diversity in a population. The mechanism for this is simple: the fact that different social groups exist triggers a meaning to belonging to a group, and thus a utility from membership. This in turn creates the willingness to contribute to the public good, as it will benefit one's in-group members. So long as the positive in-group biases dominate the negative out-group biases, then the net effect is higher public good provision.
However, the econometric analysis of the distributional effects of fragmentation paints a more complex picture, once we look beyond simple average contribution levels. We observe that the jump in average contributions when we move from no social fragmentation to minimal fragmentation is driven by a higher likelihood of contributing the maximal amount. This suggests that social identity concerns, as opposed to self interest, are the driving forces in behaviour in our experiment.
When we compare the behaviour of majorities to that of minorities, we find that the effect of fragmentation is highly dependent on the type of feedback subjects received about others. The type of feedback we provided to subjects in different treatments proxies the degree of visibility of the actions taken by members of a particular social group. In one condition, subjects could observe all the individual contributions in a given period, while in another condition, subjects only knew the total contribution by the other five subjects in that period. A possible interpretation of our information conditions is that the former mimics the conditions one experiences in a small community, where the behaviour of every individual is very easy to monitor. The latter proxies the conditions one experiences in, say, a large city -there, one can only observe aggregate levels of public good contribution, but not what each individual contributes.
The interaction of informational condition with fragmentation reveals different behavioural responses by minority members, particularly in the condition where the minority consisted of one individual. When individual feedback is available, minority members are more likely to fully contribute to the public good and less likely to free-ride. However, conditional on contributing a fraction of their endowment, they contribute on average less than the majority group members. When individual information is unavailable, we find almost the opposite effect: minority players are more likely to free-ride and less likely to fully contribute. If contributing some of their endowment, they are indistinguishable from majority members.
This suggests that the capacity to single out individuals can lead to them conforming to a particular norm, even under the strict anonymity conditions afforded by the lab.
In short, the social context in which people contribute towards a public good is an important determinant of the effect of social fragmentation. Our finding that visible minorities display higher contribution rates also suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that social integration may be easier in (or more beneficial to) smaller communities rather than large cities.
In this sense, it is perhaps appropriate to return to the quote with which we began the paper. Putnam (2007) argues that while beneficial in the long run, in the short-run social diversity brings about a generalised decline in trust, not only towards outsiders but also to those from one's social group. This decline is reflected in lower civic participation and lower levels of cooperation. Our findings suggest that his findings are unlikely to be explained by social identity arguments. Not only are our highest public good contribution levels recorded in a treatment with social heterogeneity, but they are highest when the actions by members of the minority group are visible. The reason for the discrepancy could lie in factors outside the scope of this study: the role of social networks (who you know and who they know) and how they interact with labour market conditions (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005; Pendakur and Pendakur, 2005) . We leave such issues for future research.
In this part we will show you five pairs of paintings by two artists. For each pair of paintings, you must choose the one you prefer. Once everyone makes their five choices, we will divide participants into two groups according to which artist they preferred.
Once you have been allocated to one of the groups, we will show you a further two paintings. Your task will be to identify which artist painted which painting. You will be allowed to confer with your fellow group members in order to determine the answer to the two questions. To this effect, you will have access to a chat programme, through which you can offer help or get help from your fellow group members.
Messages you post in the chat box will only be visible to members of your own group.
You will not be able to see the messages posted by members of the other group and viceversa. You will be able to communicate with your fellow group members for 10 minutes before submitting your answers. You are free to post how many messages you like.
There are only two restrictions on messages: you may not post messages which identify yourself (e.g. age, gender, location etc.) and you may not use offensive language. For each correct answer you will earn 10 ECU. Once everyone submits their answers, the experiment will move to the second part. You will only be informed of your payoff in this part of the experiment at the very end of the session. Remember that ECUs earned in one round do NOT carry over to subsequent rounds.
You will start every round with the same endowment of 20 ECUs.
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be informed about your decision, the decision of each participant, the total amount of ECUs contributed to the project and your payoff. You will also know whether each person with whom you are playing belongs to either the Kandinsky or the Klee group, but not their exact identity.
To this effect, the computer will scramble the order in which the other participants are listed when individual contributions are shown at the end of every round.
Once the 20th round is over, the experiment will be over. The computer will select two rounds at random. Your payoff in those two rounds plus the payoff from part 1 will determine your total earnings in the session.
Part 2 (PG+CG: 3-3 Treatment) -only seen after the end of Part 1
In this part of the experiment you will be matched with five other participants. You will be interacting with the same five participants until the end of the experiment. There will be 20 rounds in this part of the experiment. At the beginning of each round, each participant will receive 20 ECUs. We will call this your endowment. Your task in each round is to decide how to use your endowment.
You must decide how many ECUs you want to contribute to a public project, which is available to all six participants, how much to contribute to a project which is only This formula implies that your payoff in every round is based on three parts:
1. The ECUs you kept for yourself: (20 ECU -Your contribution).
2. The income from the public project, which is 40% of the total contribution from you and from the other five participants.
3. The income from the group project, which is 80% of the total contribution from you and from the other two members of your group (Klee/Kandinsky only).
To fix ideas, lets consider a few numerical examples.
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Suppose that each of the six participants contributes 10 ECU to the public project and 0 ECU to their own groups project. This means the total contribution to the public project is 60 ECU and the total contribution to your group project is 0 ECU. In this case, the income from the public project is 0.4*60=24 ECU to each of the six participants, while the income from your groups project (only payable to your groups members) is 0 ECU.
Suppose instead that each of the six participants contributes 0 ECU to the public project and 10 ECU to their own groups project. This means the total contribution to the public project is 0 ECU and the total contribution to your group project is 30 ECU.
In this case, the income from the public project is 0 ECU to each of the six participants, while the income from your groups project (only payable to your groups members) is 0.8*30= 24 ECU.
Each ECU you keep to yourself raises your payoff by 1 ECU. Each ECU you contribute to the public project raises the total contribution to the project by 1 ECU and causes your income from the public project to rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. The income of the other five participants will also rise by 0.4 ECU, so that the total income of the six participants from the public project will go up by 2.4 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of everyone else.
Each ECU you contribute to the group project raises the total contribution to the group project by 1 ECU and causes your income from the project to rise by 0.8*1=0.8
ECU. The income of your other group members will also rise by 0.8 ECU, so that the total income of the three group members from the group project will go up by 2.4 ECU.
Your contribution to the group project therefore also raises the income of your fellow group members, but not the income of non-group members.
In other words, 1 ECU invested in the public project yields a total benefit of 2.4
ECU to the six participants. 1 ECU invested in your group project yields a total benefit of 2.4 ECU to the three members of your group only.
Remember that ECUs earned in one round do NOT carry over to subsequent rounds.
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be informed about your decision, the decision of each participant, the total amount of ECUs contributed to the public and group projects and your payoff. You will also know whether each person with whom you are playing belongs to either the Kandinsky or the Klee group, but not their exact identity. To this effect, the computer will scramble the order in which the other participants are listed when individual contributions are shown at the end of every round. Once the 20th round is over, the experiment will be over. The computer will select two rounds at random. Your payoff in those two rounds plus the payoff from part 1 will determine your total earnings in the session.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proposition 1: In the n-player VCM game, where each player i contributes x i towards a public good and receives a monetary payoff π i such that π i := y − x i + a n j=1 x j and has social preferences u i (π i , π Proof: Throughout our analysis we will only consider symmetric equilibria, in that all members of the same group make the same contribution in equilibrium. To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we check To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we check ∂ 2 u i ∂x i ∂x j . For a given S, we have a symmetric game.
18 Given the utility function we know that Proposition 2: In the n-player VCM game with social preferences: (i) An increase 18 At this point we could, as Chen and Chen (2009) do for the minimum-effort game, use the symmetric properties of this game to calculate the optimal threshold a which enables full cooperation for a given level of social fragmentation. However, our focus here is how equilibrium contributions change as a function of S.
(1) 
